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Abstract
Low-skilled migrant workers are often directed into foreign labor markets through
middleman facilitated trade. Analyzing migration outflows of workers from agricul-
tural Bangladesh, I construct a latent variable model to determine migration decisions.
From this, empirical analysis is done on migration data to find relationships between
middleman fee and other observable characteristics. I use a Heckman selection model,
which provides strong evidence of self-selection by productivity and risk-preference,
as well as weaker evidence for selection on the basis of productivity by middlemen.
Overall, there is a lack of remigration and loss of experienced workers in the destina-
tion marketplace as well as very large degrees of variation in returns to education and
productivity between countries.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Low-skilled migrant labor makes up significant proportions of the workforces of many
wealthy, low-population states. Such practices are common in much of Asia and the
Gulf States. The majority, close to 70 percent, of Singapore’s non-resident working
population, numbering around 1.6 million workers, consists of low-skilled migrant labor
(National Population and Talent Division, 2011). Qatar’s 1.2 million foreign workers
make up 94 percent of its total labor force. The same patterns of employment exist
in countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and many
others, where workers from developing economies, including India, Bangladesh, the
Philippines and Indonesia work as domestic workers, construction labor, or hold other,
mostly low-skilled jobs.
Laborers are generally recruited from their home countries by a network of agencies
and then matched with an employer. These workers are almost always temporary, remit
much of their income, and live within modest means in their country of employment.
In many cases, housing and food is provided by their employer. Additionally, many
migrant workers have little to no grasp of the native language in their country of
employment, which may create information asymmetry. In this paper, I will attempt
to answer the question of what characteristics explain difference in selection of male
migrant workers from agricultural regions Bangladesh into foreign labor markets to
determine if selection of workers into labor markets is efficient or if it suffers from
adverse selection.
Migrant worker recruitment has both development implications and implications
on market productivity. Migrant remittances constituted over 6% of Bangladesh’s
GDP in 2016, and over 30% for other some countries. Improving migrant income
and welfare could significantly increase national GDPs and reduce poverty in many
migrant-sending economies (World Bank, 2016). Investigating the efficiency of these
migrant markets has potentially large implications on economic development of many
low-income economies. Furthermore, investigating the network of recruitment also has
human rights implications. Migrants into these labor markets are generally bound to
an employer by law, as in the case through the ”Kafala” system in the Gulf States
and similar labor laws in Singapore (Human Rights Watch). If migrant recruitment
specifically targets less informed workers, they will be less knowledgeable about labor
conditions in the destination country.
Migrant worker recruitment also has implications on the firms of the host economies
as well. In most countries, Migration is generally limited by regulation, so inefficient
selection has negative impacts on overall productivity. For example, Singapore has low
productivity levels in comparison with other countries of a similar development level
and low productivity growth in its construction sector, with many complaints (such as
high worker turnover) stemming from a reliance on foreign labor and labor recruitment
(Lim, Alum 1995). Being able to identify the cause of selection could potentially boost
sector productivity and overall productivity in many migrant destination countries.
3
1.2 Industry Background
The recruitment process for migrant workers into the construction is different from
conventional mechanisms of search and matching generally seen in labor markets. The
following industry description is based on the specific regulations and terminology the
hiring process of a worker into the Singaporean construction market. The recruitment
process for countries in Gulf States and other Southeast Asian countries is similar,
and identical with respect to middlemen recruitment in the migrant-sending country
(Bangladesh). As the majority of the analysis in this paper will focus on recruitment in
the migrant-sending country, minor labor law distinctions in the migrant-destination
country are not of major significance. The important laws and institutions of interest
that exist in all markets and destination are the presence of middleman networks and
laws that bind the worker to a single firm.
First, an employer with a certain number of vacancies (with a hard limit set by
the Ministry of Manpower) sends a demand letter to an agent in Singapore for these
to be filled. Next, the agent in the destination country will contact a counterpart in
the migrant-origin country, who will then contact or send an agent to recruit from a
village. The migrant will pay a fee to the final agent in the chain, who will then send
the migrant’s information back through the chain. The migrant will be provided with
a short period of training to learn basic construction skills before being matched with
an employer and provided an In-principle Agreement (IPA), giving him his wage and
length of contract. However, the wage given on the IPA is not often not the final wage;
there is generally another wage negotiation that occurs in Singapore, resulting in a
wage that is often lower than what is first given. If the migrant agrees to the initial
agreement, he is then sent to Singapore and works under what is generally a one or
two-year contract. After his contract the migrant generally returns to his country of
origin and may reenter the process if he wants to find another job in a foreign country.
Figure 1: Migration Process (Baey, Yeoh 2015)
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1.3 Literature Review
Analysis will be informed by prior research mostly in three categories: middleman lit-
erature, development literature, and labor economics literature. Middleman literature
provides a theoretical framework that is used in analyzing middle-directed migration
networks, as does the previous literature on labor market dynamics. Development lit-
erature, especially regarding migration and region-specific characteristics, also informs
some of the assumptions that will be used in the following paper.
”Middlemen” provides a structure under which middlemen activity can be extrap-
olated and modeled (Rubinstein, Wolinsky 1987). In addition, ”Asymmetric Informa-
tion and Intermediation Chains” gives a general result that could be possible in this
context, where there is trade under asymmetric information with long intermediation
chains (Glode, Opp 2016). With middleman activity, the result can either be an im-
provement of market efficiency or a decrease in market efficiency. Certain scenarios,
such as when the middleman becomes an expert on the good he or she is purchasing,
this activity can be conducive to efficient outcomes (Biglaiser, 1993). The presence of
middlemen also depends on the inherent frictions in the market, which in the case of
migration, are large search and information frictions (Spulber 1996). The hypotheses
of middleman theory are tested in the analysis of the labor intermediation between
rural Bangladesh and the Singaporean construction market, where selection by pro-
ductivity would be the result of efficient intermediation. At a more basic level, another
theoretical paper used in modeling selection of workers and contracts based on produc-
tivity and information is “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ”Bayesian”
Players” (Harsanyi 1967).
”Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes” models selection into the labor mar-
ket based on productivity and shows how overall market productivity changes over
time (Flinn 1997). Labor market dynamics depend on the heterogeneity of workers in
selection, as does overall productivity.
The empirical procedures are very similar to methods commonly seen in labor eco-
nomics. As is the case with labor market participation, migration suffers from selection
bias. Migrants self-select into labor markets, and in this specific scenario, middlemen
also select for migrants. Correcting for this selection bias, a Heckman selection model
is used (Heckman 1976). The theoretical modeling of employment decision made use
of previous literature in discrete choice models in labor economics and empirical tests
(Keane et al. 2010). As is often the difficulty in labor economics The Roy model of
income distribution and employment choice was also taken into consideration, as were
as its corresponding empirical tests (Heckman, Sedlacek 1985). The variation of one
productivity variable used in this paper, rather than the skill vector used in most Roy
Model employment choice formulations, was due to the workers being of a very similar
demographic: young men, similarly educated, from agricultural regions in Bangladesh.
In many formulations of the Roy Model, demographic characteristics are used to proxy
for variation in skill distribution. As in this scenario, demographic characteristics are
fairly uniform, skill differentiation is vertical, along a single productivity vector.
Research in migrant characteristics and migration labor markets also precedes this
paper. The assumption of migrants as profit-maximizers stems from increased migra-
tion activity and investment after exchange rate shocks in the Philippines (Yang 2008).
From this assumption, higher income spurs more migration. Information asymmetry
has also been documented in the domestic worker migration market to Singapore,
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where a randomized control trial found that providing workers with more information
on wages and laws increased wages in the treatment group (Shrestha, Yang 2017). The
theoretical assumption that under observable productivity, surplus is divided through
a Nash Bargaining equilibrium was also motivated by the results of the randomized
control trial done by Shrestha and Yang. They found that providing workers with
more information on labor laws did not increase mobility rates, but did increase bar-
gaining power as measured through worker wages. It is reasonable to assume that the
same information asymmetry may also be present in the construction sector and other
low-skill sectors, which shares similarities with recruitment of domestic workers. Also,
although not a piece of economics literature, Bangladeshi Migration to Singapore, a
sociological analysis, gives an immense amount of information on migration networks
and institutions that inform my analysis (Mizanur Rahman 2017). Mizanur Rahman’s
book details migration processes from Bangladesh into Singapore as well as into other
migrant-receiving destinations, especially the Gulf States.
The model of migration choice and qualitative observations from ”Underinvestment
in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in Bangladesh” were also
used (Bryan et al. 2014). Bryan et al. found that individual-specific, experiential
learning was vital in determining migration payoffs and utilities, which is also present
in this paper’s analysis.
1.4 Contributions
Research in migration channels contributes to understandings of intermediation and
provides either an example of efficiency loss or an demonstration of curtailing high
search costs and middle-man mediated positive hierarchical sorting. If the analysis of
selection does result in demonstrated deadweight-loss, this would be a demonstration
of the results of ”Asymmetric Information and Intermediation Chains” (Glode, Opp
2016). If we see a result that demonstrates efficient selection, then it is a demonstration
of middlemen benefiting market efficiency, and we can assume of the characteristics of
the market as described in ”Middlemen as Experts” (Biglaiser 1993).
In addition to applications of theoretical models, this analysis would also add to
the literature on developmental impacts of migration and migrant characteristics. A
demonstration of information asymmetry in the market could motivate a randomized
control trial similar to that of ”Facilitating Worker Mobility” to truly confirm or deny
the hypothesis (Shrestha, Yang 2017). In terms of development literature, there has
been little focus on the middlemen intermediation networks of migration itself. Un-
derstanding these networks is crucial in understanding the developmental impacts of
migration. Research in the field of migration networks could add to both applied mid-
dleman theory and migration economics. Results also have policy implications on steps
that governments or international organizations could take to facilitate migration or
boost efficient sorting between workers and firms.
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2 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 SURF Dataset
The smallest dataset, of 142, was collected at Singapore’s ”Little India” district at both
a remittance bank and a free meals program for injured migrant workers in May through
July of 2016. The dataset was for a project funded by a Summer Undergraduate
Research Fellowship (SURF) by UNC-Chapel Hill. Preliminary analysis on this dataset
served as pilot analysis for the analyses and trends in the larger datasets.
The dataset contains observables such as wages, middleman fees, age, years worked
abroad, education, marital status, children, remittances, and savings information. This
dataset is combined with the larger IOM/DFID migrant household survey for further
analyses.
2.2 IOM&DFID Bangladeshi Migrant Household Survey
The first survey of its kind, the Migrating Out Of Poverty (MOOP) research consor-
tium, sponsored by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UK
Department for International Development (DFID) conducted surveys of migrant and
non-migrant households in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe
between 2013 and 2015. In each country, the researchers sampled approximately 900
migrant households and 300 non-migrant households. The Bangladesh specific survey
was done in 2013.
The dataset contains information on wage, remittances, middleman fees, education,
destination country, marital status, dependents, months worked abroad, pre-migration
wage, assets, migrant connections at destination location, and household income. The
sample of this survey includes both international and internal migrants, as well as non-
migrants. The majority of the analyses done in this paper will be based off of this
dataset.
2.2.1 Geographic Origin of Migrants
The migrants from this dataset were completely rural. For reference, Bangladesh is
divided into 64 districts (or zilas), 493 upazilas, and 4,554 unions. The sample collected
was from the 6 districts of Chapail Nawabganj, Tangail, Satkhira, Gaibandha, Chit-
tagong, and Barishal. More specifically, the workers were sampled from the 6 upazilas
of Gumastapur, Kalihai, Kolaroa, Shaghata, Anwara and Agaijhara and the 8 unions
of Bangabari, Nagbai, Sonataria, Saghata, Haildhar, Barashat, Rajihar, and Bakal.
Below is a map of Bangladesh, with the two largest cities of Dhaka and Chittagong
in red. The upazilas from which the families were surveyed are in black. Below is a
map of the Upazilas,the smallest level at which coordinate-locations were available and
unambiguous.
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Figure 2: Geographic Origin of Sampled Migrants with Major Cities for Reference
Table 1: Migrant Origin by Upazila
Upazila Frequency Proportion
Gumastapur 186 16.80%
Kalihati 180 16.26%
Kolaroa 160 14.45%
Shaghata 163 14.72%
Anwara 187 6.58%
Agaijhara 231 20.87%
Total 1107 100%
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2.3 Transient Workers Count Too Work History Survey
Data was collected by a Singaporean migrant worker advocacy nonprofit Transient
Workers Count Too (TWC2) between November of 2015 through May of 2016. Surveys
were taken at a total of ten locations of Singapore on Sundays, where migrant workers
spend their weekly day off: Boon Lay, Chinese Garden, Jurong East, Botanic Gardens,
Orchard Road, Esplanade, Little India, Farrer Park, Aljunied and Paya Lebar. In total,
1133 responses were collected, of which about 20% were discarded, leaving a sample of
910.
This dataset contains information on wage, age, nationality, years worked in the
market, and wage history.
3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2: International Migrants
Mean SD Min Max
Age 29.77 5.95 18.0 45
Education (years) 8.75 3.69 0.0 18
Children 0.76 1.03 0.0 4
Migration Fees* 320400.77 325110.17 0.0 3500000
Household Earnings* 36231.02 264980.72 790.9 5256123
Total Migrations 1.96 3.01 1.0 36
Months Worked 48.22 41.14 2.0 264
Pre-migration Wage* (N=218) 6025.90 8041.31 108.4 100000
N 536
Table 3: International Migrants (No Missing Data)
(1)
mean sd min max
Age 29.81 6.06 20.0 42
Education 7.98 3.85 0.0 18
children 0.81 1.09 0.0 4
Migration fees* 284990.26 341490.65 200.0 3500000
Household Earnings* 36231.02 264980.72 790.9 5256123
Total Migrations 1.96 3.01 1.0 36
Months worked 42.05 37.63 2 260
Pre-migration Wage (N=218) 6025.90 8041.31 108.4 100000
N 394
*Monetary figures in Bangladesh taka 2010 adjusted
9
Table 1 details some observable characteristics of international migrants. All in this
sample were male and from agricultural regions of Bangladesh. International migrants
tend to be well-educated, with 8.75 years of education slightly under the equivalent
of a high-school diploma in Bangladesh (10 years). Household income of migrants is
significantly higher than the Bangladeshi average of 31,883 BDT (Bangladeshi Taka),
as measured in 2016 (Note the survey was done in 2013), and approximately double
the household earnings of the average rural household, at 18,349 BDT(Power and
Participation Research Centre 2016).
The average amount paid in migration fees, mostly to the middleman, is roughly
equivalent to USD$3850, and roughly equivalent to nine months of household earnings
after migration.
Table 4: Internal Migrants
Mean SD Min Max
Age 27.93 6.10 20.0 42
Education 8.31 5.03 0.0 18
Children 0.72 0.95 0.0 4
Migration Fees* 31284.19 166819.69 40.0 3050000
Household Income* 23747.90 66032.26 632.7 1170488
Total Migrations 5.68 10.37 1.0 90
Months Worked 41.54 49.10 2.0 264
Pre-Migration Wage* (N=141) 3208.26 2284.47 114.0 12756
N 456
*All Monetary figures in Bangaldeshi Taka 2010 adjusted
Internal migrants tend to be slightly younger and similarly educated, as compared
to international migrants. Household earnings are below that of international migrants,
but still larger than those of most rural households. Pre-migration wage of internal
migrants is observed to be approximately half of that international migrants. Internal
migrants also tend to migrant more frequently, with the average internal migrant having
already gone on 5.68 migrations, while the average international migrant only having
made 1.96 migrations. However, the average recorded duration of work for both internal
and international migrants differ by only six months.
The average migration fee for internal migrants is also approximately ten times
less than that of international migrants. The average migration fee of 31284.19 is
approximately USD$375, about a month and a half of household income.
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics: Non-migrants
Mean SD Min Max
Age 30.70 6.71 20.0 42
Education 5.85 5.03 0.0 25
Children 1.23 1.17 0.0 4
Household Earnings* 15672.69 32452.17 0.0 325048
N 257
*All Monetary figures in Bangaldeshi Taka 2010 adjusted
The non-migrant sample of households, comparing males in the migrant range,
shows that non-migrants tend to be less educated than both internal and international
migrants. Household income for non-migrant households is also slightly smaller than
the average for rural Bangladesh.
Table 6: Marital Status of Migrants
Marital Status Unmarried Married Total
Non-Migrant 63 194 257
(24.5%) (75.5%) (100.0%)
Internal migrant 199 259 458
(43.4%) (56.6%) (100.0%)
International migrant 253 294 547
(46.3%) (53.7%) (100.0%)
Total 515 747 1262
(40.8%) (59.2%) (100.0%)
The proportion of internal and international migrants that are married is fairly
similar. The proportion of the married population among males between 20 and 42 is
higher than that of both groups of migrants.
Table 7: Migrant Destination Countries
Destination Country Frequency Proportion
Singapore 169 30.90%
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 136 24.86%
Saudi Arabia (KSA) 84 15.36%
Malaysia 69 12.61%
Oman 36 6.58%
Kuwait 12 2.19%
Other 41 8.41%
Total 547 100%
In this sample, the plurality of international migrants work or worked in Singapore,
with many going to the Gulf States as well. Almost all destination countries are in
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either Southeast Asia or the Middle East. Note that the sample of destination countries
are not representative of all low-skilled migrants from Bangladesh.
Table 8: Middleman Fee by Country (Bangladesh Taka, 2010 Adjusted)
Destination Country Mean Standard Deviation
Singapore 416396.32 197394.48
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 291761.97 354121.62
Saudi Arabia (KSA) 355709.56 369884.56
Malaysia 284916.34 376393.46
Oman 228568.88 62369.41
Kuwait 366645.99 420132.03
Other 238125.9 557007.1
From table 7, we can see that there is a large degree of variation for middleman fees
both within country and between countries. For most of these countries, the standard
deviation of middleman fees is greater than the mean. In all cases, middleman fees are
equivalent to at least 6 months of the average household income after migration.
Table 9: Occupations of International Migrants
Occupation Frequency Proportion
Construction Laborer 107 31.94%
Domestic Worker 37 11.04%
Manufacturing 34 10.05%
Informal Sector 30 8.96%
Tailor 26 7.76%
Service Worker 23 6.87%
Other 78 23.38%
Total 335 100%
Table 10: Occupations of Domestic Migrants
Occupation Frequency Proportion
Construction Laborer 121 28.14%
Manufacturing 88 20.47%
Service Worker 47 10.93%
Domestic Worker 25 5.81%
Technician/Professional 20 4.65%
Administrative Staff 19 4.42%
Other 110 25.58%
Total 430 100%
from tables 9 and 10, we see that for both markets, the industries that employ
about 75% of migrants are almost identical. The plurality of workers in both labor
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markets work in the construction sector, and manufacturing as well as domestic work is
common in both markets. Note that ”service workers” in the domestic migration labor
market perform tasks very similar to domestic workers, primarily focused on cleaning.
This once again shows the similarities between both classes of migrants, as their job
functions are very similar.
4 Assumptions
1. Middleman is a profit-maximizer
The middleman, as a firm, chooses the workers who are willing to pay the highest
fees to migrate.
2. Migration as a household decision:
The decision to migrate is made in order to maximize household income, not only
the income of the migrant. In a question given by the IOM & DFID household
survey asking ”who was involved in making the decision to migrate?”, 94.8 %
of the migrants listed other parties, almost all family members, with only the
remaining 5.2 % listing themselves. This is consistent with previous patterns
observed of migrant workers, where most of the money earned in the international
market is sent home. The fact that migration is made as a joint family decision
means that income will likely go to the family unit as a whole, rather than just
the individual.
3. The international market is more productive than then internal market
The internal sector is in Bangladesh, while the international sector is in higher-
paying developed countries. This is further evidenced by the remittances in each
sector, as well as household income, as seen in tables 4 and 5. Furthermore, re-
mittances of international migrants are over triple that of international migrants,
indicating much higher wages in the international sector.
Table 11: Internal Migrants
N Mean SD
Remittances (Internal Migrants) 388 5843.34 9902.656
Remittances (International Migrants) 310 19814.13 36582.46
4. Identical characteristics are rewarded in both internal and international migration
markets
From tables 9 and 10, the jobs worked by international migrants and international
migrants are very similar. Therefore, the skills of both internal and international
migrants are relatively similar, and that ability to work certain jobs are rewarded
in both markets. If a worker can perform a task in the internal market, he will
also be able to perform it in the international sector and be compensated more
for his skills (seen from the previous table).
5. International firms and workers cannot communicate
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The international firms are not able to hire workers directly in Bangladesh. Hiring
must take place through middleman. This also means that firms are not able to
directly observe the workers who they are hiring.
6. International firms given an exogenous constraint, V of total workers
Usually by immigration restriction, the total number of workers allowed in a
marketplace is limited by an external constraint.
5 Empirical Testing on Selection
Determining the presence of either selection by productivity or adverse selection in-
volves discerning the impact and significance on various worker covariates on migra-
tion likelihood and migration fee. Given the list of worker observables, the direction
of the coefficient as well as its significance would provide evidence for either surplus-
maximizing selection by productivity or a form of adverse selection, leading to lower
overall production levels. Then we formulate a latent variable function that translates
into Probit and Heckman regressions after which we list the covariates and describe
how the direction of its coefficient would be evidence for one form of selection of the
other. From this we can provide evidence for either surplus-maximizing selection by
productivity or adverse selection.
5.1 Latent Variable Function Formulation
First, we consider the utilities of workers, before incorporating middleman fee. The
observable characteristics available on workers are Age (Ai), education (Ei), number
of children (Di), Marital Status(Mi), connections (Ci), pre-migration wage (WB,i),
number of total migrations (MT ), and total months worked (T ). In the structural
equation, ci denotes consumption. Unobserved variables that impact utility of not
migrating are denoted it. For example, this may include risk preference. Unobserved
variables that impact wage offers in the domestic and international market are γit and
ηit respectively; in the selection by productivity setting these can include endowments
of ability, for example. The interpretations of coefficients on the variables are as follows:
1. Age: We assume that reservation utility is increasing on age, and productivity is
increasing (as the ages in our sample of workers is limited to men between 20-40).
A positive coefficient would mean selection by workers with higher productivity, a
negative coefficient would indicate selection of those with lower reservation utility.
2. Education: We assume that productivity is increasing on education. As more
education workers are more productive, a positive coefficient for the education
variable would indicate returns to education in the labor market and provide
evidence for selection by productivity.
3. Connections: Connections in the destination market would increase the amount
of knowledge a worker has on the wage distribution. A statistically significant
and positive coefficient on this value would mean that middlemen recruit those
with more information, while a negative coefficient would indicate an incentive
to recruit workers with less information about the market.
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4. Total Migrations: A higher number of total migrations indicates more work ex-
perience, a positive value on the coefficient for this variable would be evidence for
selection by productivity, while a negative value would be evidence for adverse
selection. Productivity is assumed to increase with work experience. A negative
value indicates a possibility of the presence of recruitment on the basis of those
with less information.
5. Pre-migration wage: Productivity and reservation utility are assumed to be in-
creasing on re-migration wage. A positive coefficient on pre-migration wage could
indicate selection by productivity, of those with higher reservation utilities, or
selection of those who are less risk-averse (assuming decreasing relative risk aver-
sion). A negative coefficient would indicate selection of those with lower reserva-
tion utilities.
6. Number of Children/ Marital Status: Used primarily in the probit, children and
marital status of migration impacts reservation utility in migration. The number
of children a worker has and his marital status is assumed to have no relationship
with his productivity, but as children and a spouse bring utility, it is assumed to
increase reservation utility.
We assume that γit and ηit have a joint normal distribution, while epsilonit is
independent of the other two error terms and normally distributed. We then formulate
the structural equations for worker utility as:
Uit = cit + αi(1− dext,it) where αit = βMMit + βDDit + it (1)
cit = wext,itdext,it + wint,i(1− dint,it) (2)
wint,it = βA,intAit + βE,intEit + βMT,intMTit + βTi,intTit + γit (3)
wext,it = βA,extAit + βE,extEit + βMT,extMTit + βT,extTit + ηit (4)
The function βA,intAit + βE,intEit + βMT,intMpit + βTi,intTit, which gives the return
to wages in the domestic sector by each of the observable variables, is to be denoted as
ϕ(Ωit), where Ωit ⊂ ~Xit is the individual-specific set of endowment characteristics that
are observed. Likewise, let ψ(Ωit) denote βA,extAi+βE,extEit+βMT,extMTit+βT,extTit,
the returns to wages in the international sector by each of the observable characteristics.
Under unrestricted migration, a worker then chooses to migrate internally if Uint,it >
Uext,it.
Uint,it > Uext,it:
ϕ(Ωit) + γit − (ψ(Ωit) + ηit) > 0
or
γit − ηit > ψ(Ωit)− ϕ(Ωit)
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Similarly, for the decision to migrate internationally, Uext,it ≥ Uint,it. For the
decision to migrate internationally over internally, this results in the value function of:
V exti (Ait, Eit,Mp,it, Tit, γit, ηit) = Uext,it − Uext,it = (βA,ext − βAint)Ait + (βE,ext − βE,int)Eit+
(βMT,ext − βMT,int)MTit + (βT,ext − βT,int)Tit + ηit − γit
Thus the worker will migrate internationally if:
ηit − it ≥ (wb,it + βMMit + βDDit − ψ(Ωit))
and
ηit − γit ≥ ϕ(Ωit)− ψ(Ωit)
However, incorporating restricted migration, we create a formulation for middleman
fee. For each worker, the middleman sets a fee proportional to his wage gains from
migration, that is
Fit = ρ(wext,it − wint,it)
where Fi is observed for all workers who migrate internationally (we assume the
next-best option for international migrants is to migrate internally). However, given
the external constraint on worker vacancies the decision to migrate is the restricted
to the worker’s with the highest gains from migration or willingness to pay. That is
Fit ≥ F ∗, where F ∗ is set by the middleman and observable. F ∗ is the middleman fee
of the worker that pays the least amount of money to migrate. Then, a worker only
migrates internationally if
ηit − γit ≥ U∗ − (ϕ(Ωit + ψ(Ωit))
From this, we can construct the likelihood function of workers who migrate as well
as estimate the coefficients on the variables which influence migration. The likelihood
function for international migration, incorporating middleman fees, is then:
L(θ; Ωit) =
S∏
i=1
Pr(dext,it = 1, Fit|Ωit)dext,itPr(dext,it = 0|Ωit)1−dext,it
=
S∏
i=1
Pr(ηit − γit ≥ U∗ − (ϕ(Ωit) + ψ(Ωit)), ηit − γit = ϕ(Ωit) + ψ(Ωit)− Fit)dext,it
Pr(ηit − γit < U∗ − (ϕ(Ωit) + ψ(Ωit))1−dext,it
(5)
Estimating the likelihood function through a Heckman regression, we can find the
values of the coefficients on the observable variables and standard errors for the un-
observable variables. We then formulate the econometric estimation for selection by
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productivity and adverse selection. Testing for the presence of adverse selection in-
volves interpretation of coefficients related and unrelated to productivity, comes with
the addition of additional regresssors.
In this model, we assume that the next best option a worker who chooses to migrate
internationally is always to migrate internally. We also assume the most productive
workers are sorted into the international migration market. If one is not selected into
the international market, then his productivity is high enough to receive positive utility
from migrating internally. Therefore, the next best option of any worker who would
choose to migrate internationally would be to migrate internally.
These formulations then allow us to satisfy the exclusion restriction for the Heck-
man selection model, which will be used to answer the question of what explains the
heterogeneity in selection of migrants into the international migration market.
The econometric procedure will first use probit analysis to find the characteristics
that lead to a higher probability of migration, then use a Heckman regression to find
the impact of worker observables on migration fee, which will allow us to determine
the presence of adverse selection in the migration market. Additionally, a simple OLS
regression is used at first to see if there is a correlation between wages and migration
fee, which is a straightforward result under the above specification.
17
5.2 Regression on Migration Fee and Wages
Table 12: Remittances vs. Migration Fee
(1)
Remittances (BDT Inflation Adjusted to 2010)
Migration Fee 0.0286∗∗∗
(4.27)
Age 84.19
(0.17)
Education (Years) 507.92
(0.79)
Connections -1404.80
(-0.32)
Total Migrations -292.57
(-0.33)
Children 559.96
(0.20)
Married (1 = Married, 0 = Unmarried) -2874.1
(-1.32)
cons 21489.88
(0.05)
N 320
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Firstly, running a ordinary least squares regression shows that migration fees of mi-
grants is correlated with remittances. That is, workers that pay a higher fee to migrate
do see a return in the form of higher remittances. This provides some evidence of
selection on the basis of productivity, that more productive workers know they will
garner higher wages abroad and be willing to pay higher fees.
5.3 Multinomial Tests
To determine self-selection, I perform a multinomial logistic regression. International
migrants are compared with internal migrants and non-migrants. For the regression,
non-migrants are set as the base case and the following regressions are performed:
18
ln(
Pr(InternalMigrant)
Pr(Non−Migrant) ) = β0 + β1Ait + β2Eit + β3Mit + β4Dit + it (6)
ln(
Pr(InternationalMigrant)
Pr(Non−Migrant) ) = β5 + β6Ait + β7Eit + β8Mit + β9Dit + it (7)
5.3.1 Multinomial Logistic Regression Results
Table 13: Multinomial Logit on Migrants (Base case: non-migrants)
Migrant Status
Internal Migrant
Age -0.0445∗∗
(-2.72)
Education 0.0983∗∗∗
(5.31)
Marital Status (1 = Married, 0 = Unmarried) -0.0441
(-0.57)
Children -0.151
(-1.57)
cons 1.405∗∗
(2.79)
International Migrant
Age 0.0263
(1.68)
Education 0.108∗∗∗
(5.99)
Marital Status (1 = Married, 0 = Unmarried) -0.241∗∗
(-2.67)
Children -0.324∗∗∗
(-3.44)
cons -0.141
(-0.28)
N 1219
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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5.4 Interpretation of Probit Regressions with Regard to
Theoretical Model
The multinomial logit model, while showing selection by productivity, does not distin-
guish between self-selection and selection by middlemen. It is already evident from the
descriptive statistics that migrants as a whole are more educated and wealthy than the
general population. The multinomial logit provides further evidence that international
migrants are likely more productive and less risk-averse, as evidenced from education
levels and family characteristics. Marriage and having children is assumed to make
workers more risk-averse.
6 Empirically Testing Selection byWorker Char-
acteristics
International migration is selection based on two parties, both a middleman and a
worker. While the probit regression shows selection on the basis of productivity in
the case of both internal and international migrants, this does not imply that middle-
man choose workers by productivity. As middleman are profit maximizers, they will
choose the set of workers for whom they can charge the highest middleman fees. The
fee charged is a function of the wage differential, which is a function of worker-level
characteristics. As workers in both markets work very similar jobs, I assume they are
rewarded for the same characteristics, with returns to productivity being higher in the
international sector, thus the equation for middleman fee can be formulated as such
(see appendix D). We begin with the assumption that selection occurs based on pro-
ductivity, testing for middleman selection involves a linear Heckman selection model,
with the response equation, as:
ln(Fext,it) = β10MText,it + β11Eex,it + β12Aext,it + ~βext,it · ~Xex,it + ex,it (8)
Where the vector of controls includes country and year-level fixed effects. The
second component, the selection equation, is as follows.
Exit = β13Aext,it + β14Eext,it + β15Dext,it + β16Cext,it + β17Mext,it + it (9)
The same interpretations of the coefficients as are used in the probit regression
apply.
Testing the presence of selection by information asymmetry involves nesting the
first response equation into an alternate specification including the connections (C)
variable, another proxy for information. That specification is then as follows:
ln(Fext,it) = β10MText,it + β11Eex,it + β12Aext,it + β13Cext,it + ~βext,it · ~Xex,i + ex,i
(10)
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Table 14: Heckman Regression: Middleman Fees on Observed Variables
(1) (2)
Log Middleman Fees Log Middleman Fees (With Country Level Fixed Effects)
ln(Middleman fees)
Age -0.0164 -0.0172∗∗
(-1.21) (-2.64)
Education (Years) -0.0175 0.0180∗
(-0.92) (1.91)
Connections -0.289∗ 0.0262
(-2.11) (0.38)
Total Migrations -0.126∗∗∗ -0.0301
(-4.41) (-1.51)
cons 14.02∗∗∗ 13.54∗∗∗
(9.57) (20.14)
Select
Age 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗∗
(5.61) (5.75)
Education -0.00184 -0.00944
(-0.17) (-0.85)
Connections -0.00383 -0.0357
(-0.04) (-0.38)
Total Migrations -0.0789∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(-6.59) (-7.06)
Children -0.0553 -0.0756
(-0.85) (-1.13)
Married (1= Yes) -0.326∗∗ -0.327∗∗
(-2.65) (-2.58)
cons -1.241∗∗∗ -1.185∗∗∗
(-4.57) (-4.25)
athrho
cons 0.0627 0.257
(0.29) (1.09)
lnsigma
cons 0.277∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗
(7.50) (-9.62)
N 850 824
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 21
6.0.1 Results of Tests and Interpretation
From table 12, the selection equations show the coefficients on age as positive and
significant at the 1 percent alpha level. Older workers, who are assumed to be more
productive, have a higher probability of migrating internationally. Number of total
migrations is negative and significant at the 1 percent alpha level, which indicates loss
of productivity as more experienced workers are less likely to migrate internationally.
Married workers are also less likely to migrate internationally, which is consistent with
marriage increasing an individual’s reservation utility.
The response equations also show similar trends. Total migrations is negative and
significant at an alpha-level of 1 percent in the regression without country-level fixed
effects, while connections to the destination market is negative and significant at an
alpha-level of 5 percent. However, one country-level fixed effects are included, the
regression gives mixed results. One one hand, the coefficient on education is positive
and significant at an alpha-level of 5 percent, while the coefficient on age is negative
and significant at the 1 percent alpha level. Note that while the coefficient on total
migration is no longer significant, the t-statistic has a p-value of about 6 percent.
Note the inverse mills’ ratio (λ) on both regressions. In both cases, the inverse
mills the regression is statistically significant at the 1 percent alpha level, showing the
presence of selection bias. However, it is positive in the regression without country
level fixed effects and negative in the regression with country level fixed effects. This
implies that without country-level controls, the error term in the selection equation
and the middleman fees equation is positively correlated when not controlling for des-
tination country, while it is negatively correlated when destination country is factored
in. When not including destination country, unobserved characteristics that increase
the probability one migrates increases middleman fee, while the opposite is true when
controlling for destination country.
There is a dramatic difference between the model including and excluding country
level fixed effects. Exploring this further, I run a regression including interaction
effects on the 6 countries most represented in the data: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, Malaysia, and Singapore.
Once again, the inverse mills ratio is negative, indicating unobserved characteristics
that increase the probability of migration decrease the migration fee. However, includ-
ing interaction effects shows a great deal of variation between countries with regard to
selection. The coefficient on education is positive and statisticall significant at the .1%
alpha level, indicating that more educated workers in general pay more to go abroad.
This is evidence that more productive workers know that they will receive more wages
upon migrating and are willing to pay more for the premium.
However, there are very notable differences between countries. The coefficients on
all of the countries’ interactions with education was negative and statistically significant
at the 0.1% alpha level, with the exception of Kuwait (which have a p-value of 6%). For
Malaysia, and Singapore, these negative coefficients were greater in magnitude than
the overall positive coefficient on education. We can conclude that while there may be
recruitment on the basis on workers with higher amounts of education overall, this is
not the case in many of the major destination markets.
Similarly, the effect of total migrations on migration fees also varies greatly by
country. While the coefficient on total migrations for those going to Kuwait is positive
and significant at a 5% alpha level, the coefficients on migrants to the other Gulf states
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Table 15: Heckman Regression with Interaction Effects
(1)
lnmiddlemanfees
lnmiddlemanfees
Age -0.00911
(-1.37)
Education 0.169∗∗∗
(5.00)
EducationxKSA -0.144∗∗∗
(-3.76)
EducationxUAE -0.153∗∗∗
(-4.22)
EducationxKuwait -0.113
(-1.55)
EducationxOman -0.171∗∗∗
(-3.83)
EducationxMY -0.185∗∗∗
(-4.61)
EducationxSG -0.171∗∗
(-2.71)
Connections 0.0330
(0.50)
Total Migrations -0.0338
(-0.61)
Total MigrationsxKSA -0.178∗
(-1.70)
Total MigrationsxUAE -0.130∗
(-1.97)
Total MigrationsxKuwait 0.570∗
(2.37)
Total MigrationsxOman 0.0144
(0.10)
Total MigrationsxMY -0.0494
(-0.35)
Total MigrationsxSG 0.0203
(0.36)
cons 13.78∗∗∗
(20.85)
select
Age 0.0601∗∗∗
(5.84)
Education -0.0100
(-0.90)
Connections -0.0362
(-0.39)
totalmigrations -0.121∗∗∗
(-7.05)
children -0.0812
(-1.22)
Married -0.332∗∗
(-2.64)
cons -1.202∗∗∗
(-4.31)
athrho
cons 0.344
(1.35)
lnsigma
cons -0.546∗∗∗
(-8.66)
N 824
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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is negative and significant at the same alpha level. The coefficients on other countries
is insignificant.
7 Distribution of Work Experience Comparisons
Figure 3: Total Migrations
A comparison of the distribution of work experience, as measured by total migrations,
also evidence the adverse selection and loss of productivity. In both cases, most mi-
grants are first time migrants, but there is a much higher prevalence of remigration in
in internal migrants, as evidenced by mean and skewness measures. The mean num-
ber of total migrations by the group of international migrants is 1.96, while the mean
number of total migrations by internal migrants was nearly triple that figure, at 5.68.
The kurtosis measure of international migrants is 65.66, while the measure for inter-
nal migrants is 27.32. The relative lack of remigration provides further evidence for
lower than optimal production outcomes, as more experienced workers are exiting the
market.
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8 Explaining Patterns of Migration into Inter-
national Markets
We can evaluate a number of explanations for selection of migrants into international
labor markets using.
1. Productivity: Migration into international labor markets shows self-selection on
the basis on productivity. Migrants who migrate internationally tend to be well-
educated and have higher incomes than those who migrate internally and non-
migrants. However, the difference in education, in comparison with internal mi-
grants, is quite small.
There is evidence for middlemen selecting for productivity, as migration fee does
correlate with remittances. However, note that there is a great deal of variation
between countries with regard to selection on the basis of experience and edu-
cation. Overall, more migrants who are more educated pay higher fees, but this
varies greatly between countries. The same is true for work experience, markets
certain countries seem to reward previous experience, while others do not.
2. Reservation utility: It is not the the case that the workers with lower reserva-
tion utility migrate internationally. International migrants have higher incomes
than domestic migrants. Although controlling for income, migrants tend to be
unmarried, indicating lower reservation utility. Overall tough, migrants seem
to wealthier than their non-migrant counterparts, indicating higher reservation
utility.
3. Information: Middlemen have incentives to recruit first-time workers and those
with less connections to the destination marketplace. There is evidence from
this analysis that there is a significant amount of information asymmetry in the
migration market, which explains a considerable degree of variation in migration
fees. Both probability of migrating and migration fees are negatively impacted
by factors that increase information about the destination market. This provides
evidence that middlemen do recruit first-time workers, who have less information
about the destination market. Also, note that the effect of knowing someone in
the destination market on wages and labor expectations is much weaker than the
effect of previously working in the market. As noted by Bryan et al., migration
patterns seem to only change after experiential knowledge, not just passage of
information.
4. Risk Preference: Risk preference explains self-selection to some degree. Migrants
coming from higher-income households can be partially explained by decreasing
relative risk aversion. As posited by Bryan et. al, a failed migration is not as
costly to higher-income households as it is for lower-income households (2014).
Marital status of migrants also provides evidence of self-selection on the basis of
risk-preference, as married people are assumed to be more risk-averse than single
people. Younger workers, who are assumed to be more risk-loving than older
workers, are also willing to pay more.
Risk preference does not explain all patterns of migration. However, variables
that decreased risk, connections at the destination country and previous migra-
tions, resulted in a lower probability of migrating and lower expected utility from
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migration. If selection were on the basis of risk-preference, decreasing the risk
from migration should results in a greater propensity to migrate.
5. Migration as one-time income source: Contrary to our assumption of migrants
as maximizing profit over a lifetime, which would mean migrants would migrate
for multiple trips to increase income, it is possible that migration is used as
a temporary source of income in response to certain income shocks. Tables 8
and 9 show household reports on remittance spending, much of which tends to
be on events that could be possibly attributed to one-time shocks or needs for
capital. By far the largest use of remittance spending, for both international
and internal migrants, is on health and medical spending, followed by funding
of homestead construction projects. It is possible that migration is in response
to these needs, and after earning enough money to satisfy these requirements,
migrants will remain home.
However, this does not explain the discrepancy between migration rates of in-
ternational and domestic migrants. In both cases, remittance spending is fairly
similar, but internal migrants tend to remigrate at much higher rates than do
international migrants. Although responses to shocks and raising capital does
factor into migration decision, it does not appear to explain heterogeneity be-
tween migrant workers.
Table 16: Remittance Spending: International Migrants
Occupation Frequency Proportion
Health and medical 109 45.29%
Construction and development of homestead 34 12.32%
Pay off migration-finance loans 29 10.51%
Pay off other loans 24 8.70%
Household Goods 16 5.80%
Other 64 23.18%
Total 276 100%
Table 17: Remittance Spending: Internal Migrants
Occupation Frequency Proportion
Health and Medical 161 48.79%
Construction and development of homestead 46 13.94%
Pay off other loans 30 9.09%
Household goods 27 8.18%
Education 13 3.94%
Farm agricultural material 13 3.94%
Other 86 26.06%
Total 330 100%
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9 Conclusion
The migration patterns show some evidence for migrants paying migration fees accord-
ingly to wage gains, with a high degree of variation between countries. Overall, rates
of remigration are low, which results in productivity loss in the destination country
and loss of remittance money for the migrant-sending country.
Further research should focus on the migration market to a specific country, as
there is a noted difference between migration fees and returns to various worker char-
acteristics between countries.
9.1 Policy Implications
Figure 4: Worker Attrition (Transient Workers Count Too)
Addressing the issue of inefficient middleman selection could address policy problems
such as low productivity growth and worker retention in many labor markets. Figure
2 shows worker attrition, a concern of the Singaporean government and NGOs, which
is partly attributable to middleman selection. This market failure provides a strong
impetus for international cooperation on labor recruitment, as well as implementing
laws in Bangladesh regarding middlemen that already exist in other countries.
9.1.1 Policy Implications within Sending Country
Regulations in Bangladesh should focus on better regulation of middlemen and ensuring
workers have proper information before migrating. A model to follow is the Filipino
POEA (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), which performs random
checks on middleman firms and oversees worker training (Agunias 2010). Bangladesh
could also focus on stronger enforcement of existing laws regarding migrant middleman.
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The difficulties in enforcement stem from Bangladesh being a predominantly rural
country.
9.1.2 International Cooperation
Migration is an ideal issue for international cooperation, as a better organized system
of migration can have results in gain for both the destination and the source country.
Already, certain countries have cooperative agreements regarding migration regulation
and migrant welfare. Regarding Bangladesh, in 2012 Bangladesh and Malaysia agreed
to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to better regulate migrant flows between
countries and allow for migrant workers to file lawsuits against fraud by labor recruiters
or businesses (Wickramasekara 2016). However, there has yet to be a case filed under
this law.
Priorities of the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries often do not align,
with the destination usually being more concerned about workforce productivity, while
the sending country is generally more concerned about remittances and protection of
its citizens. This can be seen through differences between policies in a migrant-sending
country as compared to the migrant-receiving country. These MoU agreements can
often create solutions that satisfy both priorities, for example, in the Bangladesh-
Malaysia agreement, government industries often hire directly through the Bangladesh
BMET (Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training), which oversees training
workers for migration. This reduces middlemen fees and loan payments for migrants,
and ensures a degree of quality by workers for the receiving country.
9.1.3 Policy Implications within Destination Country
A critical aspect of many of the systems of migrants labor from Bangladesh and other
low-income migrant sending countries is relationship between the worker and employer.
In almost all cases, the worker is directly tied to the employer (referred to as the
”Kafala” system in Arabic). This means that after a worker contract is terminated or
a stint of work ends, the worker is sent back to the migrant-sending country and must
restart the migration process. Although certain countries, such as Singapore, which
allows for workers on the last 40 to 21 days of a work permit to search for jobs, mobility
is very limited in country. For one, workers generally are not guaranteed time to search
for jobs and must still work in that time period. Allowing workers a short period to
stay in the destination country to find jobs after one contract would increase worker
retention and increase workforce productivity through retention of existing workers.
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Appendices
An earlier developed theoretical framework, this gives the assumptions under which
each form of selection occurs as well as necessary conditions for first-best production
outcomes under middleman-facilitated selection. The theoretical model more clearly
outlines implications of selection on productivity in the receiving country.
A Theoretical Setting
Agents
• Set M middlemen: aggregated as one firm, operating as a first-degree price dis-
criminator
• Set S of potential migrants, of size S
Set S is a finite
• Set I of domestic firms: aggregated into one firm
• Set E of international firms: aggregated into one firm
• Middleman: sets migration fee: Fi, ∀si ∈ S
• Worker: chooses to migrate internally, internationally, or to remain at home
• Domestic Firm: sets wage wint,i
• International firm: sets wage wext,i
Worker’s Problem
Explaining heterogeneity in migrant outcomes is a confluence of self-selection and mid-
dleman selection. The population for middleman directed migration from Bangladesh
is mostly young, low-skilled men who were previously subsistence farmers. Any poten-
tial migrant has three choices:
• Remain in the home village, performing agricultural labor
• Migrate internally, performing mostly low-skilled household labor
• Migrate internationally, performing either construction or household labor
The decision to migrate depends on the endowment of characteristics on each in-
dividual, denoted ~X. Utility of not migrating is denoted as reservation utility Ui(
~X).
Utility of migration internally is a function of wage and cost of movement and working:
Uin,i( ~X) = U(win,i( ~X))−Ui( ~X) (11)
Utility of international migration, similarly, is a function and wage and cost of move-
ment. In addition to movement cost, international migration also includes middleman
fees (Fin). Thus, the utility for each worker is given as:
Uex,i( ~X) = U(wex,i( ~X))− Fi( ~X)−Ui( ~X) (12)
The worker will choose to migrate internationally if Uex,i ≥ Uin and Uex,i ≥ Ui( ~X).
The worker will choose to migrate internally if Uin,i > Uex,i and Uin,i ≥ U.
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Middleman’s Problem
The middleman is assumed to be a first-degree monopolist, and chooses the profit
maximizing set of workers. For each individual worker, the middleman can set a price
such that
Fi = U(Wex,i( ~X))−Ui( ~X) (13)
Given an external constraint of V by the firm, the firm chooses the set of workers
such that piM =
∑n
i=1 Fi is maximized, where Fi ≥ 0.
Firms’ Problem
The firm chooses a quantity of workers to maximize total profit, that is:
maximize
Q
pii(Q) = PQ−W (Q) (14)
Where W (Q) is the entire sum of wages paid to all workers, and price P is exoge-
nous.
First Best Outcome
The most efficient scenario, with optimal output, would be one in which both firms have
perfect information on worker characteristics, and workers have perfect information on
firm productivity and wages. In this idealized scenario, we assume that workers and
firms can communicate. Such a scenario would have no need for a middleman, and
selection into each market would result in first-best production levels in a standard.
Productivity of migrants will be given as their cost of working: C( ~Xi) ∀si ∈ S In this
ideal iteration of the model, the assumptions are as follows:
Assumptions
1. Perfect Information
2. Uniform utility functions
3. The international market is more productive than then internal market
The international market is more productive and lucrative than the internal
market: dpiextdq >
dpiint
dq and piext(q) piint(q) ∀q
4. Identical characteristics are rewarded in both internal and international migration
markets
Cext( ~X)) = Cint( ~X))
5. Firm and workers can directly communicate
6. International firms given an exogenous constraint, V of total workers
7. Costless movement between all markets
30
Timing
A slight modification is made to the timing of the model, as there is no longer a place
for middleman activity:
• t=0: Worker discovers endowments
• t=1: International firm given V vacancies (i.e. restriction on immigration), hire
workers
• t=2: Firm produces good, receives total revenue
• t=3: Firms receive profit, worker receives wages
Outcome
In this idealized scenario, there is no need for a middleman, as firms are able to directly
hire workers. For each worker, the firm has information on the worker characteristics
and the ideal quantity the worker can produce to maximize firm profits and total
surplus. Firm profits, for both firms, and worker wages are then determined by a Nash
bargaining equilibrium in period 3. The total surplus is defined as
maximize
q
piB(q)− CB( ~X, q) = Ti where B = ext, int (15)
and
q∗ = argmax piBi(q)− CB( ~X, q)
To maximize total surplus, the optimal quantity produced will be until dpiBdq =
dCB( ~X)
dq . Each worker has a corresponding total surplus associated with him. This
total surplus is then divided with a Nash bargaining equilibrium into firm profits and
worker wages. The bargaining problem is as such:
maximize
wB,i
(u(wB,i))
α(piB(wB,i))
(1−α)
subject to u(wB,i) ≥ 0
pi(wB,i) ≥ 0
u(wB,i) + piB(wi) ≤ Ti
(16)
Where
w∗B,i = argmaxu(wi)+piB(wi)=Ti u(wi)
α(pi(wi))
1−α
As the the constraint u(wi) + pi(wi) ≤ Ti is binding.
We assume that bargaining power between all workers is constant; therefore, if total
surplus produced by a worker is higher, than his wage will also be higher. Likewise,
firm profits will also be higher for workers who produce higher total surplus. Provided a
constraint on number of workers who can be hired, the firm chooses the V workers with
the lowest cost of working. That is, V worker will work in the international firm, and
‖S‖−V workers will work either in the internal firm or choose not to migrate. The most
productive workers choose to work abroad, as wext,i > wint,i from the assumption that
the marginal value of labor is more valuable for international firm. Note that if there
were no constraints on migration, all workers would choose to migrate internationally
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given a sufficiently lowly level of reservation utility, U. Also, note that the wages of the
workers who do work in the international labor market are higher than the would-be
wages of workers who did not migrate internationally, as only the workers who create
the largest amount of total surplus migrate internationally.
Determining whether the workers choose to migrate internally is similar. The total
surplus for the internal firm in determined, as a function of worker endowments. Then
if wint,i ≥ u, the worker will choose to migrate internally.
Given worker endowments, the worker will work in the international market if his
productivity is above some certain threshold set by the firm. Cost of working is a
function of worker endowments, ~Xi ∈ Rn for all si ∈ S. We call the set of all worker
endowments Y ⊆ Rn. Then dC∗dq∗ is the minimum of marginal productivity for all
workers, that is, the minimum of Cext(Y )dq∗i
for all ~Xi ∈ Y . That is, dC∗dq∗ is the marginal
cost of production at optimal production for the least productive worker in the set of
workers designated by the international firm as sufficiently productive.
Then the decision to migrate for the worker as a function of his endowments is
given as such:
dext( ~Xi) =
 1 if
dCext( ~Xi)
dq∗ ≤ dC
∗
dq∗
0 if dCext(
~Xi
dq∗ >
dC∗
dq∗
(17)
If the worker does not migrate internationally (Dext,i = 0), then the decision to
migrate internally is given as a function of worker endowments as
dext( ~Xi) =
{
1 if u(wint,i( ~X)) ≥ Ui
0 if u(wint,i( ~X)) < Ui
(18)
These outcomes will provide first-best production levels, maximizing levels of pro-
duction and total surplus. The most productive workers are hired into the international
sector, while less productive workers are filtered into the domestic, internal migration
sector. The least productive workers remain as agricultural laborers. This scenario is
the ideal scenario for a central planner, as it is Pareto optimal and maximizes total
surplus in the economy.
B Middleman Facilitated Selection
In reality, the firm cannot communicate directly with the workers when filling its vacan-
cies. The firm contracts hiring through a middleman, another profit-maximizing firm.
The middleman has no incentive to ensure the socially optimal outcome of maximum
total surplus, though there are scenarios where this outcome occurs. In the following
sections, I will outline the assumptions and scenario in which the first-best production
outcome is achieved and scenario where production is sub-optimal.
C Selection under Perfect Information
It is possible that middleman-facilitated migration results in the same production levels
as if firms were able to evaluate their workers. In this scenario, middleman would
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act as experts to filter the market of less efficient workers, similar to the scenario
outlined by Biglaiser (1996). If we assume that workers have perfect information of the
international migration market, workers would know their wage from migrating into
each market. Middlemen will then maximize their profits by selecting the set of most
productive workers. The assumptions, most of which are consistent from the model
with communication between firm and worker, are as follows:
Assumptions
1. Perfect Information
2. Uniform utility functions
3. The international market is more productive than then internal market
The international market is more productive and lucrative than the internal
market: dpiextdq >
dpiint
dq and piext(q) ≥ piint(q) ∀q
4. Identical characteristics are rewarded in both internal and international migration
markets
Cext( ~X) = Cint( ~X)
5. International firms and workers cannot communicate
6. International firms given an exogenous constraint, V of total workers
7. Costless migration to internal sector
8. Uniform reservation utility
Ui( ~X)) = Uj( ~X)∀si, sj ∈ S
Timing
• t=0: Worker discovers endowments
• t=1: Middleman given exogenous constraint V(vacancies), sets Fi for V workers
• t=2: Workers pay fee, choose to migrate internally, or stay at home
• t=3: Firms produces goods, receives profit
• t=4: Worker receives wages
Outcomes
Once again, workers engage in a process of backwards induction to determine their
wage from working in both international and internal markets. Wage is determined
in both markets with a Nash bargaining equilibrium, where for all workers, wages are
higher in the international migration market than the domestic market.
Then the utility of migrating internally is then given by
Ui( ~X)
int = U(wi,int( ~X))−Ui (19)
And the utility of migrating externally is given by
Ui( ~X)
ext = U(wi,ext( ~X))−Ui (20)
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From this, the additional utility from migrating internationally, in comparison with
the next best option of migrating internally, is the difference in expected utility of the
wages: U(wi,ext( ~X)) − U(wi,int( ~X)). For each worker, si ∈ S, the middleman is then
able to charge a fee,
Fi( ~X)) = U(wext( ~Xi))− U(wint( ~Xi)) (21)
Proposition 1. Workers who are more productive are more profitable for the middle-
man. That is: ∂ci(
~X)
∂q∗i
<
∂cj( ~X)
∂q∗j
⇒ Fi > Fj
Proof. Suppose there exist two workers: si and sj . Assume without loss of generality,
that worker i’s cost of working is at least as low as the threshold set by the firm,
∂ci( ~X)
∂q∗i
≤ ∂c∗( ~X)∂q and worker j has a higher cost of working than the threshold set by the
firm under the assumptions that led to the first-best production outcome:
∂cj( ~X)
∂q∗j
>
∂c∗( ~X)
∂q .
To prove that the migration fee (F ) is higher for worker i, we must show that
U(wi,ext( ~X)− U(wi,int( ~X)) > U(wj,ext( ~X)− U(wj,int( ~X))
or that
U(wi,ext( ~X)− U(wj,ext( ~X)) > U(wi,int( ~X)− U(wj,int( ~X))
It is sufficient to show that the international sector has greater returns to produc-
tivity than the internal sector, that Ti,ext−Tj,ext > Ti,int−Ti,int as we assume constant
bargaining power between workers in both markets.
The surplus maximizing quantity of production, results in first order conditions of
∂piB
qi
=
∂Ci,B( ~X)
qi
and ∂piBqj =
∂Cj,B( ~X)
qj
for both sectors B = internal, external.
At the first order conditions of each worker in the external market:
∂piext
∂q =
∂Ci
∂q for worker i and
∂piext
∂q =
∂Cj
∂q for worker j. Then at the first order
conditions of each worker in the internal market: ∂piint∂q =
∂Ci
∂q for worker i and
∂piint
∂q =
∂Cj
∂q for worker j.
As from our assumptions, the international is more productive than the internal
sector, and that same skills are rewarded in both sectors (assumptions 3 and 4). Then
for the profit-maximizing quantity, determined from the first order conditions:
q∗B = argmax piBi(q)− CB( ~X, q)
∆q∗ext = q∗i,ext − q∗j,int > ∆q∗int = q∗i,ext − qj,int
Then ∂piext∂q >
∂piint
∂q implies
∂piext
∂q (∆qext) >
∂piint
∂q (∆qint), then for worker i and worker
j, Ti,ext − Tj,ext > Ti,int − Ti,int, meaning that worker i will be willing to pay a higher
migration fee than worker j. Therefore Fi > Fj .
Although this does directly not prove that the middleman will choose the same
set of workers as the firm operating under the assumptions that led to the optimal
production levels, it does show that the workers more profitable for the middleman.
The middleman chooses the set of workers to maximize his profit given the con-
straints on vacancies, that is:
maximize
si∈S
piM =
V∑
i=1
F ( ~Xi) (22)
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As higher productivity workers are willing to pay higher fees to migrate into the
international market, the middleman then chooses the workers with the lowest costs of
working. Once again, the set of workers that migrate internationally are:
dext,i( ~X) =
 1 if
dCext( ~Xi)
dq∗ ≤ dC
∗
dq∗
0 if dCext(
~Xi
dq∗ >
dC∗
dq∗
(23)
The workers that choose to migrate internally and remain in the agricultural sector
remain the same as well. The set of workers who choose to migrate internationally,
internally, and remain at home remain the same as the first-best outcome.
D Assessing Assumptions
A certain number of these assumptions are quite unrealistic, while others can be as-
sumed for computational ease or are testable.
1. Perfect information: this is an unrealistic assumption, as workers in rural Bangladesh
have no few means of learning of the labor market in foreign markets. We can
amend this assumption to perfect information between workers and the domestic
labor market. It is reasonable to assume that rural workers will know wages in
nearby cities for certain jobs.
2. Uniform utility functions: Not realistic, but made for computational ease. This
does not allow us to factor risk preference in analysis, but does not significantly
impact other parts of the analysis.
3. International market is more productive than the domestic market: realistic as-
sumption, workers are migrating to high or middle-income countries, where pro-
ductivity is higher than it is in Bangladesh
4. Identical characteristics are rewarded in both markets: This assumption is testable
and observable. From tables 8 and 9, we can see that for both markets. As
workers in both markets take on very similar jobs, we can assume that identical
characteristics are rewarded in both markets.
5. Firms in the international sector and workers cannot communicate: Forms cannot
hire workers without going through a middleman, this assumption holds.
6. International firms given an exogenous constraint of total workers: This assump-
tion holds, as migration is subject to government restrictions.
7. Costless migration to internal sector: This assumption is not true, but migration
in domestic markets is much smaller than it is in the international sector. As seen
in table 3, the cost of migrating internally can be recuperated with one month
of work. We will keep this assumption for computational ease and because cost
of migration in the internal sector is sufficiently small that it is not dramatically
impactful on decision-making.
8. Uniform reservation utility: unrealistic assumption, as seen in tables 2 and 3,
pre-migration wage and thus reservation utility differs greatly among migrants.
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E Adverse Selection
We refer to this scenario as one of adverse selection between the middleman and the
firm. the assumptions from above are amended to a more realistic set of assumptions.
In this case, the worker lack perfect information on wages in the international market.
The middleman has perfect information on worker characteristics. I will show that this
scenario will generally lead to a loss of output for the international firm.
Assumptions
Most assumptions remain in place from the section on selection by productivity. How-
ever, in this scenario, the worker does not have knowledge on his wages in the inter-
national marketplace and reservation utility is a function of worker endowments. All
other assumptions remain
1. Perfect information between worker and internal market
2. Uniform utility functions
3. The international market is more productive than then internal market
The international market is more productive and lucrative than the internal
market: dpiextdq >
dpiint
dq and piext(q) ≥ piint(q) ∀q
4. Identical characteristics are rewarded in both internal and international migration
markets
Cext( ~X) = Cint( ~X)
5. Firms and workers cannot communicate
6. International firms given an exogenous constraint, V of total workers
7. Costless migration to internal sector
Timing
• t=0: Worker discovers endowments
• t=1: Middleman given exogenous constraint V(vacancies), sets Fi for V workers
• t=2: Workers pay fee, choose to migrate internally, or stay at home
• t=3: Firm produces good
• t=4: Firm and worker divide output
Outcomes
As is the case in previous cases, the worker’s of migrations ex ante are a function of his
endowment vectors. However, there is a slight modification in the utility of a worker
from migrating externally. In place of the previously used equation:
Ui( ~X)
int = U(Wex,i( ~X))− Fi( ~X)−Ui( ~X) (24)
We replace the deterministic value U(Wex,i( ~X)) with the stochastic U(E[Wex,i( ~X)].
Then the expected utility of migrating internationally is:
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E[Ui( ~X)]
ext = U(E[wex,i( ~X)]− Fi( ~X)−Ui( ~X) (25)
The remaining equations for worker utility equations remain from the previous
specifications. Then amount each worker is willing to pay for the middleman fee is
given by
Fi = min[E[U( ~Xi)]
ext −U( ~Xi), E[U( ~Xi)]ext − U( ~Xi)int] (26)
While in the previous section of selection by productivity, we assumed that the next
best option for workers sufficiently productive to migrate abroad would be to migrate
internally, this is no longer the case. The expected wage of a worker going abroad could
be uncorrelated with his cost of working, while the utility of working domestically is
determined by cost of working. In the assumptions of adverse selection, next best
option for a worker who desires to work internationally could be either to remain at
home or to migrate internally.
The middleman problem remains the same, the middleman will choose the set of
workers who with the most willingness to pay up to the exogenous vacancy constraint
(V) provided by the firm, once again given by equation (12).
First, we find the set of worker who would be willing to internationally under free
migration. These are the workers for whom:
E[U(wi,ext)]( ~X)− Ui( ~X) ≥ 0 and
E[U(wi,ext)]( ~X)− U(wi,int)( ~X) ≥ 0
(27)
Then, following from equation (16), the middleman sets a fee Fi equivalent to the
utility of the worker minus his next best option. From the set of workers who are
willing to migrate internationally, we can derive the set of middleman fees associated
with what we will call S′ ⊂ S, the set of willing migrants. This set of middleman fees
is also a discrete set in R. This set is denoted as set F and the middleman will choose
a minimum fee F ∗ such that for all workers selected F ( ~Xi) ∈ [F ∗,Max(F)]. Denoting
the set of selected workers T, ‖T‖ = V .
The workers who migrate internationally will then pay a fee such that F ( ~Xi) ∈
[F ∗,Max(F)].
Note that these conditions do not guarantee that the workers selected will be less
productive than selection by productivity, but they can at best be equivalent. For the
set of workers to be equally as productive, it would need to be the case that for the
workers selected in the case of selection by productivity, that:
Conditions for first-best productivity levels under adverse selection
dC( ~Xi, q)
dq∗i
≤ dC
∗
dq∗
⇔ min[E[Ui( ~X)ext]−Ui( ~X), E[U( ~Xi)ext]− U( ~Xi)int] ≥ F ∗
and
dC( ~Xi, q)
dq∗i
>
dC∗
dq∗
⇔ min[E[U( ~Xi)ext]−Ui( ~X), E[U( ~Xi)ext]− Ui( ~X)int] < F ∗
In any other case, the market would see losses in total surplus from adverse selection.
This results in a testable implication on productivity and middleman fees that workers
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selected into the migration market are still the most productive workers of the set of
total workers. It also implies that if we construct a correspondence between cost of
working and migration fee for the set of workers, then migration fee would decreasing
on cost of working for some part of a correspondence.
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